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Abstract
Zero-knowledge and multi-prover systems are both central notions in classical and quantum complexity
theory. There is, however, little research in quantum multi-prover zero-knowledge systems. This paper
studies complexity-theoretical aspects of the quantum multi-prover zero-knowledge systems. This paper
has two results:
• QMIP∗ systems with honest zero-knowledge can be converted into general zero-knowledge systems
without any assumptions.
• QMIP∗ has computational quantum zero-knowledge systems if a natural computational conjecture
holds.
One of the main tools is a test (called the GHZ test) that uses GHZ states shared by the provers,
which prevents the verifier’s attack in the above two results. Another main tool is what we call the
Local Hamiltonian based Interactive protocol (LHI protocol). The LHI protocol makes previous research
for Local Hamiltonians applicable to check the history state of interactive proofs, and we then apply
Broadbent et al.’s zero-knowledge protocol for QMA [5] to quantum multi-prover systems in order to
obtain the second result.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Zero-knowledge systems are interactive proof systems that the prover (with unlimited computational power)
can convince the verifier (with polynomial-time computational power) of the correctness of the claim without
leakage of information. By “without leakage”, we mean that there exists a polynomial-time simulator whose
output is indistinguishable from the communication of the interactive proof system. Depending on the defini-
tion of the indistinguishability, there are several variants of zero-knowledge: perfect/statistical/computational
zero-knowledge, that is, the output of the simulator is identical/statistically close/computational indistin-
guishable to that of the interactive proof system. It has been a central notion since it was proposed by Gold-
wasser, Micali, and Rackoff [11]. Though it seems impossible, Graph Isomorphism [12] and Non Quadratic
Residue [11] have perfect zero-knowledge systems, for example.
Multi-prover interactive proof systems are introduced in the relation to zero-knowledge, which is also
a central notion in computational theory and cryptography. Multi-prover interactive proof systems are
interactive proof systems with many provers, who cannot communicate with each other during the protocols
[2, 6, 11]. Each prover has to reply to the verifier without the information about communications between the
other provers and the verifier, and this restricts malicious strategies by the provers. The class of languages
that have multi-prover interactive proofs is denoted as MIP. The computational equivalence MIP = NEXP was
proved by Babai, Fortnow and Lund [4], and hence IP, which is the class of languages that have single-prover
interactive proofs (= PSPACE [25]), and MIP are different unless PSPACE = NEXP. Under the statistical
or perfect zero-knowledge condition, multi-prover interactive proofs are much stronger than single-prover
interactive proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs of NP with a single-prover need the assumption that one-way
functions exist [23], but multi-prover interactive proofs do not need any computational assumptions. Even
multi-prover interactive proofs with perfect zero-knowledge can compute all languages in MIP [6].
In quantum complexity theory, quantum analogues of these interactive proof systems have been also deeply
studied. Quantum interactive proof system, where the prover and the verifier use quantum communication
and the verifier can do polynomial-time quantum computations, were introduced by Watrous [28]. Quantum
statistical zero-knowledge systems were also introduced by Watrous [29]. An important notion of zero-
knowledge systems is the honest zero-knowledge, that is, an interactive proof system is honest zero-knowledge
if it leaks no information only to the honest verifier who follows the specified protocol. Restricting the
verifier to be honest makes the construction of the simulator easier, but the equivalence between general
zero-knowledge and honest zero-knowledge is not obvious. This equivalence was proved by Watrous for
statistical zero-knowledge by using a quantum statistical zero-knowledge hard problem [30]. Kobayashi
proved this equivalence for perfect/statistical/computational zero-knowledge by the direct construction of
simulators [18]. Multi-prover interactive proof systems with entangled provers and the complexity class MIP∗
were introduced by Cleve et al. [7]. MIP∗ is radically different from classical MIP due to the non-locality.
Quantum multi-prover interactive proofs, where the verifier is also quantum, were introduced by Kobayashi
and Matsumoto [17], and the corresponding class is denoted by QMIP∗.
Despite the importance of quantum zero-knowledge and quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems,
there is little research about quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems with zero-knowledge. Recently
Chiesa et al. [8] proved that MIP∗ protocols with perfect zero-knowledge can compute NEXP, which is the
only literature that analyzed the power of MIP∗ with zero-knowledge as far as the author knows.
1.2 Results
In this paper, we investigate complexity-theoretical properties of QMIP∗ protocols with zero-knowledge,
different from MIP∗ protocols with zero-knowledge in [8]. The first result is the elimination of the honest
condition of quantum multi-prover zero-knowledge systems (QMZK∗) without any assumptions.
Theorem 1 (Informal version of Theorem 4). Any language L computed by honest zero-knowledge quan-
tum multi-prover interactive proof systems can be computed by general zero-knowledge quantum multi-prover
interactive proof systems.
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We analyze the public coin protocols of honest verifier quantum multi-prover zero-knowledge systems,
which is the analogue of the public coin QMIP∗ systems [16], since we can convert any honest-verifier QMZK∗
protocol into such a restricted protocol. Comparing the systems in [16], the new difficulty for the multi-prover
zero-knowledge case is that the malicious verifier may change messages for each prover even if the honest
verifier only sends the same one bit to all provers. The main ingredient in our proof is what we call the GHZ
test: it replaces the coin in the public coin protocol of QMIP∗ [16] by a GHZ state shared by the provers.
We analyze mainly computational quantum zero-knowledge systems, but this result also holds for statistical
quantum zero-knowledge systems. In the main text, we add one prover to eliminate the honest condition,
but this addition is not necessary. We prove that the honest condition can be eliminated without increasing
the number of the provers combining our GHZ test with the rewinding of [18, 30] in Appendix.
The second result is the construction of computational quantum zero-knowledge systems for QMIP∗ with
natural computational assumptions.
Theorem 2. Let p be any positive integer. If there exists an unconditionally binding and ]computational
hiding bit commitment scheme, every language computed by quantum interactive proof systems with p provers
has a computational quantum zero-knowledge interactive proof system with p+ 1 provers.
The main new tool is the Local Hamiltonian based Interactive Protocol (called the LHI protocol in this
paper). Local checking of the history of the computation is a very important tool in complexity theory.
The most famous example in quantum complexity theory is the Local Hamiltonian problem for QMA [19],
which is an analogue of SAT for NP. The LHI protocol is a variation of local checking of the history of the
computation for QMIP∗ protocols. Recently local checking of the history states of QMIP∗ protocols was
studied by Ji [15] and Fitzsimons et al.[10]. Their purpose is to construct efficient MIP∗ protocols. On the
other hand, the verifier in our protocol directly handles quantum history states.
In the LHI protocol, what the verifier does consists of only sending one message to provers and one
measurement on the state received from provers by one local Hamiltonian. Then we apply the technique
of quantum zero-knowledge proof for QMA by Broadbent, Ji, Song and Watrous [5] to the LHI protocols.
In their protocol for the Local Hamiltonian problem, the honest prover has to encode the witness of the
Local Hamiltonian problem, to send the commitment of the encoding key, and to convince the verifier that
the output of the verifier on the encoded witness and the commitment correspond to yes instances by the
zero-knowledge protocol for NP. The process of encoding, committing, and convincing the verifier of the
correctness of the witness for the Local Hamiltonian problem can be also applied to encode and check the
history state in the multi-prover interactive proof. The protocol also needs the replacement of coins by GHZ
states which is used to prove our first result.
Chiesa et al. [8] constructed the perfect zero-knowledge MIP∗ protocol for NEXP. The upper bound of
MIP∗(= QMIP∗[24]), however, is not obvious and QMIP∗ may not be in NEXP. Hence their result does not
imply the existence of zero-knowledge protocols for QMIP∗. On the other hand, our protocol assumes the
existence of some computational tools and our protocol is only the computational quantum zero-knowledge
system. Chiesa et al.’s protocol, however, is perfect zero-knowledge. Hence our result is incomparable to the
result of [8].
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is the preliminary section, especially the definition of
quantum multi-prover zero-knowledge is here. In Section 3, we prove the elimination of the honest condition.
In Section 4, we construct the zero-knowledge protocol for QMIP∗. In Section 5, we discuss some open
problems. In Appendix, we prove the additional result that any honest QMZK∗ protocol can be converted
into a general QMZK∗ protocol without increasing of the number of provers.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with basic quantum computation [19, 20] and quantum interactive
proof systems [27]. Our main results heavily use results from [5, 16].
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2.1 Notations
For a string x, |x| denotes the length of x. For integers n, l, define [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}, [n, l] = {n, n+1, ..., l}. In
this paper, p denotes the number of provers, and m denotes the number of turns in interactive proof systems.
Both are the polynomial size of |x|. poly denotes some polynomial in |x|. exp denotes some exponential of a
polynomial in |x|. Usually c is a completeness parameter and s is a soundness parameter in interactive proof
systems. A function (|x|) is negligible if for any polynomial g(|x|), (|x|) < 1/g(|x|) holds for any sufficiently
large |x|. For a vector |ψ〉, ‖|ψ〉‖ denotes the norm of |ψ〉. For density matrices ρ, σ, ‖ρ−σ‖ denotes the trace
distance between ρ and σ. |+〉, |−〉 denote 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉). The measurement by a binary-outcome
POVM {M, Id−M} is often called as the measurement by M . In particular, if M = |ψ〉〈ψ| for a state |ψ〉,
the measurement is called as the projection onto |ψ〉.
2.2 Universal gate and Clifford Hamiltonians
The circuit of the verifier consists of tensor products of two Hadamard gates and controlled phase gates, {H⊗
H,Λ(P )}. The set {H,Λ(P )} is universal, and hence {H⊗H,Λ(P )} is also universal. This setting is necessary
to apply the result of [5]. They used restricted forms of Hamiltonians, called Clifford Hamiltonians. Clifford
Hamiltonians are Hamiltonians realized by Clifford operations, followed by a standard basis measurement.
2.3 QMIP∗ systems
A quantum p-prover interactive proof system consists of the following data; a verifier with a private register
V, p provers with private registers P1,P2, ...,Pp, and message registers M1,M2, ...,Mp. All message registers
have l qubits. One of qubits of V is the output qubit. At the beginning of the protocol, (V,M1,M2, ...,Mp)
are initialized to |0 · · · 0〉. Provers can set any state |ψ〉 in P1,P2, ...,Pp. During the protocol, the verifier and
the provers apply their operations onto (V,M1,M2, ...,Mp,P1,P2, ...,Pp) alternatively. The verifier applies
the operations onto (V,M1,M2, ...,Mp). Prover p
′ applies the operations onto (Mp′ ,Pp′). The verifier’s
operations can be constructed in polynomial time. Prover’s operations have no such restrictions. After
applying the last operation of the verifier, the verifier measures the output qubit in the computational basis.
If the output is |1〉, then the verifier accepts. Denote this probability as pacc. The m-turn verifier for the
quantum p-prover interactive proof system applies circuits {V 1, ..., V d(m+1)/2e} which can be constructed
in polynomial time. The verifier uses V j at the j-th verifier’s turn. The m-turn provers apply operations
{P 1i , ..., P b(m+1)/2ci }i=1,...,p, where P ji is the unitary operator done by the i-th prover in the provers’ j-th
turn. Provers’ strategy is the tuple of (|ψ〉, {P 1i , ..., P b(m+1)/2ci }i=1,...,p). (V, {P1, ..., Pp}, |ψ〉) denotes the
corresponding interactive proof system, that is, the tuple of the set of circuits of the verifier and the provers’
strategy.
Definition 1. A language L is in QMIP∗(p,m, c, s) if there is an m-turn verifier V, for any x,
1. If x ∈ L, then there are m-turn provers P1, ..., Pp and a state |ψ〉 (called honest provers), pacc ≥ c.
2. If x /∈ L, then, for any m-turn provers P ′1, ..., P ′p and any state |ψ′〉, pacc ≤ s.
2.4 Quantum zero-knowledge
First, we introduce the indistinguishability of states and channels. We note that the definitions of indistin-
guishability allow the auxiliary quantum state σ.
Definition 2 (Indistinguishable states). Let S ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be a language, and let r be a function bounded by
a polynomial. For each x ∈ S, ρx, ζx are r(|x|) qubits states. The ensembles {ρx|x ∈ S} and {ζx|x ∈ S} are
computationally indistinguishable if for any function s, k bounded by a polynomial, for any circuit Q, the size
of which are s(|x|) and the output of which is 0 or 1, and for any k(|x|) qubits state σ, there is a negligible
function , such that
‖Pr[Q(ρx ⊗ σ) = 1]− Pr[Q(ζx ⊗ σ) = 1]‖ ≤ (|x|).
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Definition 3 (Indistinguishable channels). Let S ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be a language, and let q, r be functions bounded
by a polynomial. For each x ∈ S, Ψx,Φx are channels from q(|x|) qubits to r(|x|) qubits for each x ∈ S. The
ensembles {Ψx|x ∈ S} and {Φx|x ∈ S} are indistinguishable if for any functions s, k bounded by a polynomial,
for any circuit Q the size of which is s(|x|), acts on r(|x|) + k(|x|) qubits and outputs 0 or 1, and for any
r(|x|) + k(|x|) qubits state σ, there is a negligible function , such that
‖Pr[Q(Ψx ⊗ Id)(σ) = 1]− Pr[Q(Φx ⊗ Id)(σ) = 1]‖ ≤ (|x|).
Next, we introduce quantum zero-knowledge proof systems. Let (V, {P1, ..., Pp}, |ψ〉) be a quantum multi-
prover interactive proof system. Let view(V,{P1,...,Pp},|ψ〉)(x, j) be the state in register (V,M1, ...,Mp) at the
j-th turn of the interactive proof. A malicious verifier V ′ is a circuit family constructed in polynomial
time, which interacts with {P1, ..., Pp} instead of V . V ′ has an additional input register W and an output
register Z. The interaction of (V ′, {P1, ..., Pp}, |ψ〉) until the j-th turn can be interpreted as a channel
〈V ′, {P1, ..., Pp}, |ψ〉〉(x, j) from W to Z decided by (V ′, x, j).
Definition 4 (Quantum Multi-Prover Zero-Knowledge Systems). A quantum interactive proof
(V, {P1, ..., Pp}, |ψ〉) for a language L is computationally zero-knowledge if for any verifier V ′, there
is an ensemble of channels {SV ′(x, j)} (called a simulator) constructed in polynomial time, and
{〈V ′, {P1, ..., Pp}, |ψ〉〉(x, j)|x ∈ L} and {SV ′(x, j)|x ∈ L} are indistinguishable.
Let QMZK∗(p,m, c, s) be the class decided by quantum multi-prover zero-knowledge systems with p provers,
m turns, completeness c and soundness s. We define QMZK∗ := ∪p,m:poly,c−s≥ 1polyQMZK∗(p,m, c, s).
Definition 5 (Honest Verifier Quantum Multi-Prover Zero-Knowledge Systems). A quantum p-prover inter-
active proof (V, {P1, ..., Pp}, |ψ〉) for a language L is honest verifier zero-knowledge if for the honest verifier V ,
there is an ensemble of states {ΨV (x, j)} constructed in polynomial time and {view(V,{P1,...,Pp},|ψ〉)(x, j)|x ∈
L} and {ΨV (x, j)|x ∈ L} are indistinguishable.
Let HVQMZK∗(p,m, c, s) be the class decided by honest verifier quantum multi-prover zero-knowledge
systems with p provers, m turns, completeness c and soundness s. We define HVQMZK∗ :=
∪p,m:poly,c−s≥ 1polyHVQMZK∗(p,m, c, s).
We note a lemma used to eliminate the honest condition.
Lemma 1 ([1]). Assume a POVM on a state ρ with two outcomes has the outcome 1 with probability .
Denote the state after it outputs 0 by ρ0. Then ‖ρ− ρ0‖ ≤
√
.
2.5 Cryptographic tools
Here we introduce a few cryptographic tools used in the QMZK∗ protocol to apply the technique in [5].
Assuming the existence of commitment schemes, computational quantum zero-knowledge proofs for NP [30]
and quantumly secure coin-flipping [9] exist.
Definition 6 (commitment schemes). A quantum computationally commitment scheme for an alphabet Γ is
an ensemble of functions {fn : Γ× {0, 1}p(n) → {0, 1}q(n), n ∈ N} computable in polynomial time such that
following holds;
• Unconditionally binding property. For all n ∈ N, a, b ∈ Γ and r, s ∈ {0, 1}p(n), if fn(a, r) = fn(b, s),
then a = b.
• Quantum computationally concealing property. For all a ∈ Γ and n ∈ N, define
ρa,n =
1
2p(n)
∑
r∈{0,1}p(n)
|fn(a, r)〉〈fn(a, r)|. (1)
For all a, b ∈ Γ, the ensemble {ρa,n|n ∈ N} and {ρb,n|n ∈ N} are computationally indistinguishable.
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2.5.1 Coin-Flipping
A coin-flipping protocol is an interactive process that allows two parties to jointly toss random coins. We only
make use of one specific coin-flipping protocol, namely Blum’s coin-flipping protocol [3] in which an honest
prover commits to a random y ∈ {0, 1}, the honest verifier selects z ∈ {0, 1} at random, the prover reveals
y, and the two participants agree that the random bit generated is r = y ⊕ z. Damg˚ard and Lunemann
[9] proved that Blum’s coin-flipping protocol is quantum-secure, assuming a quantum-secure commitment
scheme.
3 Elimination of the honest condition
In this section, we eliminate the honest condition of QMZK∗ protocols. This needs no computational as-
sumptions. First, we reduce the number of turns. The reduction is almost the same as Kempe et al. [16].
There are no new contents except for the addition of honest zero-knowledge, while it is shown obviously.
Hence we only give the statement.
Theorem 3. Let
√
s ≤ c. Then, HVQMZK∗(p, 4m+ 1, c, s) ⊆ HVQMZK∗(p, 2m+ 1, 1+c2 , 1+
√
s
2 ).
The next proposition is easily derived by applying Theorem 3 to a protocol obtained from repeating the
original protocols with threshold value decisions.
Proposition 1. HVQMZK∗(p,m, c, s) ⊆ HVQMZK∗(p, 3, 1− 1exp , 1− 1poly ).
Proof(Sketch). HVQMZK∗(p,m, c, s) ⊆ HVQMZK∗(p, poly ·m, 1− 1exp , 1exp ) is easily shown by repeating the
original HVQMZK∗(p,m, c, s) protocol poly times, threshold value decisions and applying Chernoff bounds.
Apply Theorem 3 to HVQMZK∗(p, poly ·m, 1− 1exp , 1exp ).
The next theorem is our first result. The reason why we add one more prover (prover 0) is to prevent
prover 1, . . . , p from acting on register V (the verifier’s private register) by making prover 0 have the register
V.
Theorem 4. HVQMZK∗(p, 3, 1− , 1− δ) ⊆ QMZK∗(p+ 1, 2, 1− 2 , 1− δ
2
8 ).
Proof. First, we construct a (p+1)-prover two-turn protocol from a three-turn protocol for HVQMZK∗(p, 3, 1−
, 1− δ), in which message to provers is the same classical one bit except for prover 0, who receives no mes-
sages. The two-turn protocol is described in Figure 1. The main protocol of QMZK∗(p+ 1, 2, 1− 2 , 1− δ
2
8 )
is described in Figure 2. The proof of the correctness of the two-turn protocol in Figure 1 is the same as the
proof of Lemma 5.4 in [16]. We only discuss the conversion of a two-turn protocol in Figure 1 into a general
zero-knowledge protocol in Figure 2.
Completeness: The conversion of the two-turn protocol to the general zero-knowledge preserves com-
pleteness since the provers only have to do the GHZ test and the history test honestly.
Soundness : We construct a HVQMZK∗ protocol from a QMZK∗ protocol with a sufficient acceptance
probability. Let U ig, U
i
h be the unitary operators that prover i, for i = 1, . . . , p, does for the GHZ test and
the history test, respectively. (Prover 0 receives no messages, and hence we can assume prover 0 does only
the identity operator.)
Let ρ′′ := TrGHZ(ΠGHZ(⊗pi=1U ig)ρ(⊗pi=1(U ig)†)ΠGHZ). Here, ρ is the initial state shared by the provers in
the QMZK∗ protocol and ΠGHZ is a projection onto
|0p+1〉+|1p+1〉√
2
of registers (G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp) which is used
in the GHZ test, and TrGHZ is the partial trace operation on registers (G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp). Let Trρ
′′ = 1− 1,
where 1 is the rejection probability of the GHZ test. Let
ρ′′
1−1 := ρ
′. We use this state as the initial state of
provers. Let 2 be the rejection probability of the history test.
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Let V1, V2 be the circuit that the verifier of a three-turn protocol for HVQMZK
∗(p, 3, 1− , 1− δ) applies after
receiving message registers (M1,M2, ...,Mp) from provers 1, ..., p, respectively, at the first turn and the third
turn. The two-turn protocol is the following;
1. Select b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b to provers 1, ..., p, and nothing to prover 0.
2. Do the following tests depending on b = 0, 1:
(a) (b = 0: Forward test) Receive V from prover 0 and receive Mi from prover i for i = 1, ..., p. Apply
V2 to (V,M1,M2, ...,Mp). Accept if the original verifier of the three-turn protocol accepts the
state in (V,M1,M2, ...,Mp). Reject otherwise.
(b) (b = 1: Backward test) Receive V from prover 0 and receive Mi from prover i for i = 1, ..., p.
Apply (V1)
† to (V,M1,M2, ...,Mp). Accept if all qubits in V are |0〉, otherwise reject.
Figure 1: (p + 1)-prover two-turn honest verifier zero-knowledge protocol constructed from a three-turn
protocol for HVQMZK∗(p, 3, 1− , 1− δ).
V,Mi are the same as Figure 1. In addition, we use G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp, all of which are 1 qubit regis-
ters. At the start, prover i has Gi.
1. Select b′ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b′ to provers 1, ..., p, and nothing to prover 0.
2. Do the following tests depending on b′ = 0, 1:
(a) (b′ = 0:GHZ test)
Prover 0 sends V,G0. Prover i sends Gi, for i = 1, ..., p. Measure (G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp) by the
projection onto 1√
2
(|0p+1〉+ |1p+1〉). If 1√
2
(|0p+1〉+ |1p+1〉) is measured, then accept.
(b) (b′ = 1:History test)
Prover 0 sends V,G0. Prover i sends Mi and Gi, for i = 1, ..., p. Verifier measures G0 in the
computational basis. Let b be the output of this measurement. If b = 0, the verifier measures
(V,M1, ...,Mp) as the verifier in Figure 1 does at the Forward test. If b = 1, the verifier measures
(V,M1, ...,Mp) as the verifier in Figure 1 does at the Backward test .
Figure 2: General zero-knowledge protocol based on the protocol in Figure 1.
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Now we construct the strategy of the two-turn HVQMZK∗ protocol from the strategy of QMZK∗ protocol;
The private registers of prover i are Pi,Gi, for i = 1, ..., p. Initially prover 0 has only register V. The initial
state in (P1, ...,Pp,M1, ...,Mp) is ρ
′. If the verifier sends b to prover i (i = 1, ..., p), prover i sets |b〉 in register
Gi, applies U
i
hU
i
g
†
and sends Mi to the verifier. Prover 0 always sends V.
The rejection probability prej,hv of this HVMQZK
∗ protocol is bounded by the rejection probability prej
of the general zero-knowledge protocol as follows. Here, Πrej is the projection onto rejected states.
prej,hv :=
1
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
Tr[Πrej(⊗pi=1U ihU ig
†
)(|bp〉〈bp| ⊗ ρ′)(⊗pi=1U igU ih
†
)]
=
1
1− 1Tr[Πrej(⊗
p
i=1U
i
hU
i
g
†
)ΠGHZ(⊗pi=1U ig)ρ(⊗pi=1U ig
†
)ΠGHZ(⊗pi=1U igU ih
†
)]
≤ √1 + Tr[Πrej(⊗pi=1U ihU ig
†
)(⊗pi=1U ig)ρ(⊗pi=1U ig
†
)(⊗pi=1U igU ih
†
)]
=
√
1 + Tr[Πrej(⊗pi=1U ih)ρ(⊗pi=1U ih
†
)]
=
√
1 + 2 ≤
√
1 +
√
2 ≤ 2
√
2prej .
(2)
The first equality follows from the definition of ρ′ = 11−1 ρ
′′= 11−1 TrGHZ(ΠGHZ(⊗
p
i=1U
i
g)ρ(⊗pi=1(U ig)†)ΠGHZ)
and that 12 (|0p〉〈0p| + |1p〉〈1p|) equals to the p-qubits substate of the (p + 1)-qubit GHZ state. The first in-
equality follows since ‖ρ′ − ρ‖ ≤ √1 holds by regarding {ΠGHZ , Id−ΠGHZ} as a two-outcome POVM and
applying Lemma 1.
Zero knowledge: Before the verifier sends messages, the verifier gets no qubits from provers. Hence it
is sufficient to construct a simulator of the malicious verifier for each of the verifier’s possible messages.
First, we observe that it is sufficient to prove only the case that the malicious verifier sends the same b′
to all provers except for prover 0. Here, we define the action of the honest prover j in Figure 2 as follows;
1. If the prover j receives b′ = 1, then he/she measures the register Gj in the computational basis. Let
the outcome be b. He/she acts as the prover j in Figure 1 and sends Mj ,Gj .
2. If the prover j receives b′ = 0, then he/she sends Gj .
This definition preserves the completeness parameter. Assume that the verifier sends b′ = 1 (history test) to
prover j and b′ = 0 (GHZ test) to prover i. Prover i sends register Gi to the verifier, but the qubit in Gi is
the same |0〉 or |1〉 of Gj . Hence, if the case that the verifier sends b′ = 1 to all provers can be simulated,
the case that prover i receives b′ = 0 can be also simulated since it is sufficient to simulate any verifier who
sends b′ = 1 to all provers and aborts Mi.
The case that the verifier sends b′ = 0 to provers 1, ..., p can be also simulated since it is sufficient to
simulate the verifier who sends b′ = 1 to all provers, aborts Mi,Gi, and prepares 1√2 (|0p+1〉 + |1p+1〉). The
case the verifier sends b′ = 1 to all provers is obviously zero-knowledge since the verifier receives only the
copies of a uniform random 1 bit and the state that the honest verifier in Figure 1 receives.
Theorem 4 needs an additional prover to eliminate the honest condition, but by the rewinding technique
of [18, 30], we can eliminate the honest condition without additional provers. This result essentially follows
by combining the proof of Theorem 4 and the rewinding, and our main contribution is described in the proof
of Theorem 4. Hence we prove this result in Appendix. To prove this result, we have to restrict the verifier’s
message to one public classical bit by the technique of [16]. Let HVQMZK∗pub,1(k, 3, c, s) be the class of
problems verified by such HVQMZK systems. We omit the proof of the next theorem since it is also the
same as [16].
Theorem 5. Let
√
s ≤ c. Then, HVQMZK∗(p, 3, c, s) ⊆ HVQMZK∗pub,1(p, 3, 1+c2 , 1+
√
s
2 ).
We prove the next theorem in Appendix. This result also needs the GHZ test, and rewinding alone is not
sufficient to prove this result.
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Theorem 6. HVQMZK∗pub,1(p, 3, 1− , 1− δ) ⊆ QMZK∗(p, 3, 1− 2 , 1− δ
2
8 ).
4 LHI protocols and computational quantum zero-knowledge sys-
tems
In this section, we construct the zero-knowledge system for QMIP∗. The construction of a zero-knowledge
system for QMIP∗ consists of the following three steps;
1. Construction of the Local Hamiltonian based Interactive protocol (LHI protocol) corresponding to
the p-prover QMIP∗ protocol, which extends the protocol for checking the local Hamiltonian problem
corresponding to a QMA protocol in [5] to the QMIP∗ case.
2. Construction of what we call the LHI+ protocol, which replaces the uniform random queries by the
GHZ test.
3. Zero-knowledge protocol for QMIP∗ based on the LHI+ protocol.
Our main contribution is step 1 and 2. Step 3 is a direct application of the technique of Broadbent et al. [5].
The analysis of step 3 is almost the same as [5], and hence we only point out the main differences. In Section
4.1, we construct the LHI protocol and prove its validity. We only consider three-turn QMIP∗ protocols, as
this does not lose generality due to Lemma 4.2 of [16]. In Section 4.2, we provide the LHI+ protocol and
prove its validity. In Section 4.3, we overview the quantum zero-knowledge protocol for QMA and explain
why it works for the LHI+ protocol. In Section 4.4, we construct the final zero-knowledge protocol. We
analyze the final protocol in Section 4.5.
4.1 Construction of the LHI protocol
First, we construct a local Hamiltonian based Interactive protocol (LHI protocol) for a three-turn QMIP∗
protocol P. Intuitively, the LHI protocol checks the history state of the calculation of the interactive proof
system in Figure 4, which is transformed from the original three-turn protocol P with completeness 1− 1exp and
soundness 1− 1poly in Figure 3. We can assume such completeness/soundness errors on P due to Lemma 4.2 of
[16]. This transformation is done to locally check the communication of the interactions. Let V0 = Ut0 · · ·U1
and V1 = UT · · ·Ut0+2pl+p+1 be the circuits which the verifier in P uses (see Figure 3). Here, l is the length
of the message register Mi between the i-th prover and the verifier in P, t0 is the number of gates in V0 and
(T −(t0+2pl+p+1)+1) is the number of gates in V1. The reason why the indices of V0, V1 are not successive
is the increase of communication turns by the transformation from Figure 3 to Figure 4. This transformation
is necessary to make prover 0 send message registers M1, ...,Mp in the LHI protocol to prevent the malicious
attack on message registers by provers 1, ..., p depending on the verifier’s message. We can assume all Mi
have the same length. The LHI protocol uses T registers C1, ...,CT and p registers Me1, ...,Mep where each
of those (T + p) registers consists of a single qubit, in addition to M1, ...,Mp, and V. Intuitively, C1, ...,CT
are the time counters, Me1, ...,Mep are 1 qubit message registers. The LHI protocol is described in Figure 5.
Without loss of generality, we can assume T 5  −1 by Lemma 4.2 of [16].
Though intuitively the LHI protocol corresponds to the protocol in Figure 4, we show that if the LHI
protocol can be accepted with high probability, then the protocol P in Figure 3 can be accepted with high
probability, since we put Figure 4 for ease of intuitive understanding LHI protocols, but the correctness of
Figure 4 is logically unnecessary and proving the correctness is only redundant. The next lemma states that
if there exist provers who pass the LHI protocol, then there exist provers who pass the original three-turn
protocol P.
Lemma 2. Suppose T 5  −1. If there are provers who pass the protocol in Figure 5 with probability 1− ,
there are provers who pass the original three-turn protocol P with probability 1−O( 4
√
T 5).
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Figure 3: Original three-turn protocol P. In this figure, the number of provers is two.
Figure 4: Restricting communications to one qubit. In this figure, the length of message register is three. The
arrows l are SWAP gates. M′1 is used by honest prover 1 to receive the qubits from the verifier. Note that
M′1 is introduced to explain the behavior of the honest prover and hence it does not appear in the soundness
analysis in the main text. Communications between the verifier and prover 2 are similarly transformed.
A,B,A’ denote the correspondence to the operators A,B,A′ in Eq.(5).
9
(A). LHI protocol
1. The verifier sends t′ ∈ [2T + n] to provers 1, ..., p and nothing to prover 0.
2. Prover i sends Mei. Prover 0 sends V,M1, ...,Mp,C1, ...,CT .
3. The verifier measures these qubits by Ht′ .
Here, n is the number of qubits of V. We can assume n ≤ T .
(B). Hamiltonians used in the LHI protocol
SWAP(k,j),Mek is the SWAP operator on the j-th qubit of Mk and Mek, CNOTCt0+pl+k,Mek is a CNOT
operator which is controlled by Ct0+pl+k and acts on Mek. Πacc is a projection that the verifier in P accepts.
Id is an identity. The set {Ht|t ∈ [2T + n]} has the following Hamiltonians as described in (a), (b), (b’), (c),
(d), (e), and (f).
In (a), (b), (b’), we define Ht by Eq. (3).
Ht := |10〉〈10|Ct−1,Ct+1 ⊗
1
2
(−|1〉〈0|Ct ⊗ U ′t − |0〉〈1|Ct ⊗ U ′t† + |0〉〈0|Ct ⊗ Id + |1〉〈1|Ct ⊗ Id). (3)
If t = 1, we replace |10〉〈10|Ct−1,Ct+1 by |0〉〈0|Ct+1 exceptionally since register C0 does not exist. Similarly we
ignore register C0 in (e).
The unitary operator U ′t in Eq.(3) for (a), (b), (b’) is defined as follows;
(a) (verifier’s gate step) t ∈ [1, t0] ∪ [t0 + 2pl + p+ 1, T ]: U ′t = Ut.
(b) (communication step) t ∈ [t0 + 1, t0 + pl] : Let t = t0 + (k − 1)l + j (1 ≤ k ≤ p, 1 ≤ j ≤ l). Then
U ′t := SWAP(k,j),Mek .
(b’) (communication step) t ∈ [t0 + pl + p + 1, t0 + 2pl + p]: Let t = t0 + pl + p + (k − 1)l + j. Then
U ′t := SWAP(k,j),Mek .
In (c), (d), (e), (f), we define Ht as follows;
(c) (provers’ step) t = t0 + pl + k (k = 1, ..., p):
Ht0+pl+k := |10〉〈10|Ct0+pl+k−1,Ct0+pl+k+1 ⊗ |−〉〈−|Ct0+pl+kCNOTCt0+pl+k,Mek .
(d) (measurement by the verifier) t = T + 1: HT+2pl+p+1 := |1〉〈1|CT ⊗ (Id−Πacc).
(e) (consistency of time counters) t ∈ [T + 2, 2T ]: Ht := |01〉〈01|Ct−T−1,Ct−T .
(f) (initialization of V) t ∈ [2T + 1, 2T + n]: Ht := |0〉〈0|C1 ⊗ (Id − Πt−2T0 ). Here, Πt−2T0 is a projection
onto |0〉 of the (t− 2T )th qubit of V.
Figure 5: Local Hamiltonian based Interactive Protocol for P (in fact, for the QMIP∗ protocol in Figure 4).
(A) is the protocol. (B) shows the Hamiltonians used in the protocol given in (A).
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Proof. We construct the QMIP∗ protocol for P to compute the original three-turn protocol with acceptance
probability at least 1−O( 4
√
T 5) based on the protocol in Figure 5 with acceptance probability at least 1− .
Intuitively, (a),...,(f) in Figure 5 check the following;
(a) the verifier’s gate step
(b) and (b’) communication step
(c) the provers’ step
(d) the measurement by the verifier
(e) the consistency of the time counters
(f) the initialization of V
Let |ϕ〉 be the initial state of all the registers in the LHI protocol. Let Dk,j (D′k,j , respectively) be the
operation that prover k does in test (b) with query t = t0+(k−1)l+ j ((b’) with t = t0+pl+p+(k−1)l+ j,
respectively). Let Ek be the operation that prover k does in test (c). Denote the Pauli X operator on Mek
by XMek . Denote the projection onto |0n〉 of register V by Π0n .
Before we construct the provers’ strategy for P, we define some unitary operators. Let |t〉 =
|1〉C1 |1〉C2 · · · |1〉Ct |0〉Ct+1 · · · |0〉CT be a state in counter registers that corresponds to time t. Let
Ut0+(k−1)l+j := D
†
k,jSWAP(k,j),MekDk,j (k ∈ [1, p], j ∈ [1, l]),
Ut0+pl+p+(k−1)l+j := D
′
k,j
†
SWAP(k,j),MekD
′
k,j (k ∈ [1, p], j ∈ [1, l]),
Ut0+pl+k := Ek
†XMekEk (k ∈ [1, p]),
(4)
and
W := Σt∈[0,T ]|t〉〈t| ⊗ U†1 · · ·U†t + Πbadtime ⊗ Id,
Ak := Ut0+(k−1)l+l · · ·Ut0+(k−1)l+1,
Bk := Ut0+pl+k,
A′k := Ut0+pl+p+(k−1)l+1 · · ·Ut0+pl+p+(k−1)l+l.
(5)
where |t〉〈t| ⊗ U†1 · · ·U†t for t = 0 is |0〉〈0| ⊗ Id, and Πbadtime is a projection onto states rejected by test (e).
Intuitively, Ak, Bk, A
′
k correspond to A,B,A’ in Figure 4. Note that Ut for t /∈ [t0 + 1, t0 + 2pl+p] are already
defined by the verifier’s gates; V0 = Ut0 · · ·U1 and V1 = UT · · ·Ut0+2pl+p+1.
Using these operators, we define the strategy. The provers’ strategy (|ϕ〉, {Pk}) for P constructed from
the LHI protocol is as follows. (The strategy (|ϕ〉, {Pk}) means that the state shared initially by the provers
is |ϕ〉, at the first turn prover k sends the substate in Mk of |ϕ〉 and at the third turn prover k applies Pk on
(Pk,Mk,Mek) and sends back Mk.)
|ϕ〉 := Π0nW |ϕ〉‖Π0nW |ϕ〉‖ ,
Pk := A
′
kBkAk.
(6)
Next, we calculate the acceptance probability of the strategy (|ϕ〉, {Pk}). Now we take |ϕ〉 as follows;
|ϕ〉 = Σt∈[0,T ]|t〉|ψt〉+ |⊥〉 (7)
11
where |ψt〉 is an (unnormalized) vector, and |⊥〉 is a state that is rejected by any Hamiltonian of
(e)(consistency of the time counters) in Figure 5. ‖|⊥〉‖ is bounded by the following inequality.
‖|⊥〉‖ = ∥∥ ∑
t∈[T+2,2T ]
|01〉〈01|Ct−T−1,Ct−T |⊥〉
∥∥
≤
∑
t∈[T+2,2T ]
‖|01〉〈01|Ct−T−1,Ct−T |⊥〉‖
=
∑
t∈[T+2,2T ]
‖|01〉〈01|Ct−T−1,Ct−T |ϕ〉‖
≤ (T − 1)
√
(2T + n)
= O(
√
T 3)
(8)
The first equality follows since |⊥〉 is an incorrect time register state. The first inequality is the triangle
inequality. The second equality follows by the definition of |ϕ〉 in (7). The third inequality follows by the
probability of rejection by (e). The last equality follows by the assumption n ≤ T in Figure 5(A).
We bound the following terms (9), (10), (11), (12), using the assumption that the error probability of the
LHI protocol is  or less.
‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉‖ (t ∈ [1, t0] ∪ [t0 + 2pl + p+ 1, T ]), (9)
‖|ψt〉 −D†k,jSWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt−1〉‖ (t ∈ [t0 + 1, t0 + pl], t = t0 + (k − 1)l + j), (10)
‖|ψt〉 −D′k,j†SWAP(k,j),MekD′k,j |ψt−1〉‖ (t ∈ [t0 + pl + p+ 1, t0 + 2pl + p], t = t0 + pl + p+ (k − 1)l + j),
(11)
‖|ψt〉 − E†kXMekEk|ψt−1〉‖ (t = t0 + pl + k). (12)
We can bound (9) as follows;
‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉‖ = 1
2
(‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉‖+ ‖|ψt−1〉 − U†t |ψt〉‖)
≤
√
2
2
√
‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉‖2 + ‖|ψt−1〉 − U†t |ψt〉‖2
=
√
2
2
‖|t〉(|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉) + |t− 1〉(|ψt−1〉 − U†t |ψt〉)‖
=
√
2
2
‖Ht|ϕ〉‖ = O(
√
T).
(13)
The first equality follows from modifying 2‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉)‖ to ‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉)‖+‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉)‖ and
applying U†t to the second term. The first inequality is the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The second equality
follows since |t〉 and |t − 1〉 are orthogonal vectors. The third equality follows from the definitions of Ht in
Figure 5. The final equality follows since the whole rejection probability is at most  and the verifier selects
Ht with probability Ω(1/T ).
We can bound (10) as follows. (11) is bounded similarly;
‖|ψt〉 −D†k,jSWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt−1〉‖
=
1
2
(‖Dk,j |ψt〉 − SWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt−1〉‖+ ‖SWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt〉 −Dk,j |ψt−1〉‖)
≤
√
2
2
√
‖Dk,j |ψt〉 − SWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt−1〉‖2 + ‖SWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt〉 −Dk,j |ψt−1〉‖2
=
√
2
2
‖|t〉(Dk,j |ψt〉 − SWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt−1〉) + |t− 1〉(Dk,j |ψt−1〉 − SWAP(k,j),MekDk,j |ψt〉)‖
=
√
2
2
‖|HtDk,j |ϕ〉‖ = O(
√
T).
(14)
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The first equality follows from modifying ‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉)‖ to 12 (‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉)‖ + ‖|ψt〉 − Ut|ψt−1〉)‖)
and applying Dk,j to the first term and SWAP(k,j),MekDk,j to the second term. The first inequality is the
Cauchy-Schwarz, the second equality follows since |t〉 and |t− 1〉 are orthogonal vectors. The third equality
follows from the definition of Ht of (b). The final equality follows since the whole rejection probability is 
or less and the verifier selects Ht with probability Ω(1/T ).
We can bound (12) as follows;
‖|ψt〉 − E†kXMekEk|ψt−1〉‖ =
√
2‖|−〉〈−|(|0〉Ct(|ψt〉 − E†kXMekEk|ψt−1〉))‖
=
√
2‖|−〉〈−|Ct
(√
2|+〉CtXMekEk|ψt〉 − |0〉Ct(XMekEk|ψt〉 − Ek|ψt−1〉)
)‖
=
√
2‖|−〉〈−|Ct(|1〉CtXMekEk|ψt〉+ |0〉CtEk|ψt−1〉)‖
=
√
2‖|−〉〈−|Ct(|t〉XMekEk|ψt〉+ |t− 1〉Ek|ψt−1〉)‖
=
√
2‖|−〉〈−|Ct
(
(CNOTCt,Mek(|t〉(Ek|ψt〉+ |t− 1〉Ek|ψt−1〉)
)‖
=
√
2‖HtEk|ϕ〉‖ = O(
√
T).
(15)
The first equality follows from adding register Ct. The second equality follows from multiplying
|0〉Ct(|ψt〉 − E†kXMekEk|ψt−1〉) by −1, applying XMekEk and 〈−|+〉 = 0. The third equality follows
from |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
. The forth equality follows from |t − 1〉 = |1 · · · 1〉C1,··· ,Ct−1 |0 · · · 0〉Ct,··· ,CT+2pl+p and
|t〉 = |1 · · · 1〉C1,··· ,Ct |0 · · · 0〉Ct+1,··· ,CT+2pl+p . The fifth equality follows from that CNOTCt,Mek acts as XMek if
and only if register Ct is |1〉. The last equality is the definition of Ht of (c) and Ek.
The following equations evaluate the norm of Π0nW |ϕ〉.
‖Π0nW |ϕ〉‖
≥ 1− ‖(Id−Π0n)W |ϕ〉‖
= 1− ‖(Id−Π0n)(
T∑
t=0
|t〉〈t| ⊗ U†1 · · ·U†t + Πbadtime ⊗ Id)(
T∑
t=0
|t〉|ψt〉+ |⊥〉)‖
= 1−
T∑
t=0
(
‖(Id−Π0n)|t〉
(|ψ0〉+ t∑
t′=1
(U†1 · · ·U†t′ |ψt′〉 − U1† · · ·U†t′−1|ψt′−1〉)
)‖)−O(√T 3)
≥ 1−
T∑
t=0
(
‖(Id−Π0n)|ψ0〉‖+
t∑
t′=1
‖(Id−Π0n)(U†1 · · ·U†t′ |ψt′〉 − U1† · · ·U†t′−1|ψt′−1〉
)‖)−O(√T 3).
(16)
Here, we ignore the term
∑t
t′=1 for t = 0 for the ease of notation. The first inequality follows from the
triangle inequality. The first equality follows from the definition of W in (5) and of |ϕ〉 in (7). The second
equality follows from U†1 · · ·U†t |ψt〉 = |ψ0〉+Σtt′=1(U†1 · · ·U†t′ |ψt′〉−U1† · · ·U†t′−1|ψt′−1〉) and ‖|⊥〉‖ = O(
√
T 3)
by (8). The second inequality is the triangle inequality.
The term ‖(Id−Π0n)|ψ0〉‖ in the last line of (16) is bounded by test (f) in Figure 5 as follows;
‖(Id−Π0n)|ψ0〉‖ ≤
∑
t∈[2T+1,2T+n]
‖(Id−Πt−2T0 )|ψ0〉‖ ≤ O(n
√
T). (17)
The second inequality follows since each term in the summation of (17) is the rejection probability of each t
in test (f) in Figure 5.
The terms ‖(Id − Π0n)(UT · · ·Ut′+1|ψt′〉 − UT · · ·Ut′ |ψt′−1〉)‖ in the same line of (16) are bounded as
follows;
‖(Id−Π0n)(UT · · ·Ut′+1|ψt′〉 − UT · · ·Ut′ |ψt′−1〉)‖ ≤ ‖|ψt′〉 − Ut′ |ψt′−1〉‖ ≤ O(
√
T). (18)
The first inequality follows by omitting the projection (Id − Π0n) and applying Ut′+1† · · ·UT †. The second
inequality follows since the term ‖|ψt′〉−Ut′ |ψt′−1〉‖ equals to one of (9,10,11,12), and (9,10,11,12) are bounded
by (13,14,15).
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From (16,17,18) and the assumption n ≤ T , we have the following estimation;
‖Π0nW |ϕ〉‖ = 1−O(nT
√
T)−O(T 2
√
T) = 1−O(
√
T 5). (19)
From this, the next estimation follows;
‖(Id−Π0n)W |ϕ〉‖2 = 1− ‖Π0nW |ϕ〉‖2 = O(
√
T 5). (20)
Finally, we bound the rejection probability prej . Let Πrej be the projection onto the rejection of P. Then,
√
prej = ‖ΠrejUT · · ·U1|ϕ〉‖
= (1 +O(
√
T 5))‖ΠrejUT · · ·U1Π0nW |ϕ〉‖
≤ (1 +O(
√
T 5))(‖ΠrejUT · · ·U1W |ϕ〉‖+ ‖ΠrejUT · · ·U1(Id−Π0n)W |ϕ〉‖)
≤ (1 +O(
√
T 5))
(‖ΠrejUT · · ·U1W |ϕ〉‖+O( 4√T 5))
= ‖Πrej
T∑
t=0
UT · · ·Ut+1|ψt〉‖+O(
√
T 3) +O(
4
√
T 5)
≤
T∑
t=0
(
‖Πrej |ψT 〉‖+
T∑
t′=t+1
‖ΠrejUT · · ·Ut′+1|ψt′〉 −ΠrejUT · · ·Ut′ |ψt′−1〉‖
)
+O(
4
√
T 5).
(21)
Here, we ignore the term
∑T
t′=t+1 for t = T for the ease of notation. The second equality follows from
(19) and the definition of |ϕ〉 in (6). The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality. The second
inequality follows from (20). The third equality follows from the definition of W in (5), the definition of |ϕ〉
in (7), and ‖|⊥〉‖ = O(
√
T 3) by (8). The last inequality follows from the triangle inequality.
The term ‖Πrej |ψT 〉‖ in the last line of (21) is bounded by test (d) in Figure 5 as follows;
‖Πrej |ψT 〉‖ ≤ O(
√
T). (22)
The terms ‖ΠrejUT · · ·Ut′+1|ψt′〉 −ΠrejUT · · ·Ut′ |ψt′−1〉‖ in the same line can be bounded by (13,14,15)
as follows;
‖ΠrejUT · · ·Ut′+1|ψt′〉 −ΠrejUT · · ·Ut′ |ψt′−1〉‖ ≤ ‖|ψt′〉 − Ut′ |ψt′−1〉‖ ≤ O(
√
T). (23)
From (21,22,23),
√
prej ≤ O( 4
√
T 5) follows.
4.2 Addition of the GHZ test
Second, we construct the LHI+ protocol: we add the GHZ test which is an analogue of the GHZ test of
Theorem 5 to the LHI protocol, which is described in Figure 6. The honest verifier of the LHI protocol sends
all provers (except prover 0) the same bits, but the malicious verifier may send different bits. To prevent this
attack, the provers control which term Ht is measured by the verifier in Figure 5(A). To avoid also that the
provers are malicious, we use the GHZ test, which guarantees that the provers really chooses Ht uniformly
at random. The reason why we do not use the coin-flipping protocol to decide t is that we do not know any
multi-parity coin-flipping protocol among the provers and the verifier. For example, if we use the two-party
coin-flipping protocol between each of the provers and the verifier, the malicious verifier could choose different
t depending on the provers. The analysis of the LHI+ protocol is almost the same as the proof of Theorem
4.
Lemma 3. If the completeness/soundness of the protocol in Figure 5 are 1 − /1 − δ, then the complete-
ness/soundness of the LHI+ protocol in Figure 6 are 1− 2/1− δ
2
8 .
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Proof. The completeness is obvious. We show the soundness. The analysis is almost the same as the proof
of Theorem 5. The only differences are the definition of ΠGHZ and Πrej . Let U
i
g be the unitary operator
that prover i uses for the GHZ test and U ih be the unitary operator that prover i uses for the history test for
i = 1, ..., p.
Let ρ′′ := TrGHZ(ΠGHZ(⊗pi=1U ig)ρ(⊗pi=1U ig†)ΠGHZ). Here, ρ is the initial state of the provers in the LHI+
protocol, ΠGHZ is the projection onto (
|0p+1〉+|1p+1〉√
2
)⊗u of (G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp), and TrGHZ means the traceout
of registers (G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp). Denote Trρ
′′ = 1− 1, where 1 is the rejection probability of the GHZ test.
Let ρ
′′
1−1 := ρ
′ be the initial state of provers. Let 2 be the rejection probability of the history test.
Now we construct the strategy of the LHI protocol from the strategy of the LHI+ protocol. The private
registers of prover i are Pi,Gi, for i = 1, ..., p. Initially prover 0 has only register V. The initial state in
(P1, ...,Pp,M1, ...,Mp) is ρ
′. If the verifier sends b ∈ {0, 1}u to prover i (i = 1, ..., p), prover i sets |b〉 in
register Gi, applies U
i
hU
i
g
†
and sends Mi to the verifier. Prover 0 always sends V. The operations by provers
are as follows;
ρ′ → (⊗pi=1U ihU ig
†
)((|b〉〈b|)⊗p ⊗ ρ′)(⊗pi=1U igU ih
†
). (24)
The rejection probability of the LHI protocol prej,lh is bounded by the rejection probability prej of the LHI+
protocol as follows;
prej,lh :=
1
2u
∑
b∈{0,1}u
Tr[Πrej(⊗pi=1U ihU ig
†
)((|b〉〈b|)⊗p ⊗ ρ′)(⊗pi=1U igU ih
†
)]
=
1
1− 1Tr[Πrej(⊗
p
i=1U
i
hU
i
g
†
)ΠGHZ(⊗pi=1U ig)ρ(⊗pi=1U ig
†
)ΠGHZ(⊗pi=1U igU ih
†
)]
≤ √1 + Tr[Πrej(⊗pi=1U ihU ig
†
)(⊗pi=1U ig)ρ(⊗pi=1U ig
†
)(⊗pi=1U igU ih
†
)]
=
√
1 + Tr[Πrej(⊗pi=1U ih)ρ(⊗pi=1U ih
†
)] =
√
1 + 2 ≤
√
1 +
√
2 ≤ 2
√
2prej .
(25)
The first equality follows from that 12 (|0p〉〈0p|+ |1p〉〈1p|) equals to the p-qubits substate of the GHZ state.
The first inequality follows from that ‖ρ′ − ρ‖ ≤ √1 by Lemma 1.
4.3 Sketch of the technique of [5] and why it works for our protocol
Finally, we give the zero-knowledge protocol for QMIP∗ based on the LHI+ protocol, following the zero-
knowledge protocol by Broadbent et al. [5]. In this subsection, we roughly sketch the quantum zero-knowledge
protocol by Broadbent et al.[5] and why the technique of [5] works for our protocol. The result of [5] consists
of following ingredients;
1. The verifier tries to verify a restricted form of the Local Hamiltonian problem, called the Clifford
Hamiltonian problem, which is shown to be QMA hard. To this end, the verifier only has to measure
only Clifford Hamiltonians.
2. The honest prover encodes the witness of the Clifford Hamiltonian problem by a CSS code [20], a
quantum one time pad and a permutation. The quantum one time pad and the permutation are the
secret key of the encoding.
3. The prover sends the encoded witness and the commitment of the key of the encoding. The verifier
measures the encoded witness by one of Hamiltonians and sends the output to the prover. The prover
proves that the output of the verifier’s measurement corresponds to a yes output of the original Clifford
Hamiltonian problem by a zero-knowledge protocol for NP [30]. This correspondence critically uses the
restriction on Hamiltonians and the transversality for Clifford gates which is a characteristic of CSS
codes.
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LHI+ protocol.
We can assume 2u = n + 2T for some integer u without loss of generality. Let Gi (i = 0, ..., p) be
registers each of which consists of u qubits.
1. Select b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b to provers 1, ..., p and nothing to prover 0.
2. Do the following test depending on b = 0, 1;
(1) (b = 0: GHZ test)
(1.1) Prover i (i = 1, ..., p) sends Gi. Prover 0 sends (V,M1, ...,Mp, C1, ...,CT ) and G0.
(1.2) Measure G0,G1, ...,Gp by the projection onto
1√
2
(|0p+1〉+|1p+1〉)⊗u. If ( 1√
2
(|0p+1〉+|1p+1〉))⊗u
is measured, then accept. Otherwise reject.
(2) (b = 1: History test)
(2.1) Prover i (i = 1, ..., p) sends Mei and Gi. Prover 0 sends (V,M1, ...,Mp, C1, ...,CT ) and G0.
(2.2) Measure G0 in the computational basis. Let t be the outcome. Measure by Ht in Figure 5.
If the outcome is accepted by the protocol in Figure 5, then accept. Otherwise reject.
Figure 6: LHI+ protocol. Note that we add one prover and the GHZ test to the LHI protocol.
4. The malicious verifier’s circuits can be replaced by simulators by the assumption of the existence of
commitment schemes, and after the replacement of the verifier’s circuits, the witness state can be
replaced by a state preparable in polynomial time.
If the malicious verifier of the LHI protocol can send only the honest query, the analogues of the above items
in our case are as follows;
1. The verifier of the LHI protocol also measures by only Clifford Hamiltonians.
2. The encoding step of each prover does not depend on the other provers, and hence similar encoding
can be done.
3. The corresponding step can be done by one of the provers directly.
4. If the query of the (malicious) verifier is honest and the qubits sent from the provers is honest, this
step also can be done directly.
As we cannot assume in general that the malicious verifier of the LHI protocol can send only the honest
query, we do not directly use the LHI protocol but the LHI+ protocol, which adds the GHZ test.
4.4 Final zero-knowledge protocol: the technique of Broadbent et al. [5]
We construct the zero-knowledge protocol based on the protocol in Figure 6. The technique is almost the
same as that of Broadbent et al. [5] and the analysis is also almost the same. In this paper, we construct
the protocol and explain why the technique of [5] works. The summary of the protocol is given in Figure 7
and we describe the protocol here.
Let X = (X1, ...,Xi0+p) be (i0 + p) registers each of which has 1 qubit, where i0 is the number of
qubits of registers (V,M1, ...,Mp,C1, ...,CT ) in Figure 6. Prover 0 has (X1, ...,Xi0) that corresponds to
(V,M1, ...,Mp,C1, ...,CT ). For i = 1, ..., p, prover i has Xi0+i that corresponds to register Mei in Figure
6.
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4.4.1 Verifier’s message
First, the verifier selects b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and sends b to provers 1, ..., p. Note that b = 0
corresponds to the GHZ test and b = 1 corresponds to the history test. The verifier sends nothing to prover
0.
4.4.2 Provers’ encoding
Prover i (1 ≤ i ≤ p) who received b = 0 sends Gi. Prover i who received b = 1 and prover 0 encode X in four
steps. Let N be the length of a concatenated Steane code that the provers use. Here, a concatenated Steane
code is a code such that 1 qubit is encoded by the 7-qubit Steane code several times repeatedly. In [5], N is
taken to be an even power of 7 and bounded by a polynomial in instance size.
1. For i = 1, ..., i0 + p, Xi is encoded by the concatenated Steane code to the N qubit state (Y
i
1, ...,Y
i
N ).
2. For each i, the provers concatenate additional N qubits to (Yi1, ...,Y
i
N ), each of which is chosen from
|0〉, |+〉,|〉(:= 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉)) uniformly at random. We call these N qubits as trap qubits. At this
point, each Xi is transfered to 2N qubits (Y
i
1, ...,Y
i
2N ). The provers store the string r = r1 · · · ri0+p,
where ri ∈ {0,+,}N , representing the trap qubits.
3. Select a permutation pi ∈ S2N uniformly at random. All provers use the same permutation pi. Permute
2N qubits (Yi1, ...,Y
i
2N ) by pi.
4. Select strings a = a1 · · · ai0+p, b = b1 · · · bi0+p, where a1, ..., ai0+p, b1, ..., bi0+p ∈ {0, 1}2N , uniformly at
random. Apply quantum one time pad on (Yi1, ...,Y
i
2N ). Namely, apply X
aiZbi on (Yi1, ...,Y
i
2N ), where
for strings ai = a
1
i · · · a2Ni , b1i · · · b2Ni , XaiZbi means Xa
1
iZb
1
i ⊗· · ·⊗Xa2Ni Zb2Ni . Each of provers 0, 2, ..., p
sends each encoded qubits and GHZ qubits. Prover 1 sends his encoded qubits, GHZ qubits and the
commitment z = commit(pi, a, b, s). Here, commit(pi, a, b, s) is a string to commit the string (pi, a, b)
with a random string s using the commitment scheme assumed in Theorem 2.
4.4.3 Verifier’s measurement
If the verifier sends b = 0 (the GHZ test), then he/she measures G0, ...,Gp as in the LHI+ protocol.
If the verifier sends b = 1 (the history test), then the verifier measures the state received from provers
as follows: Ht is the summation of at most four Clifford gates, that is, Ht =
∑
vH
′
t,v, where H
′
t,v is a
Clifford gate and v ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} (see Section 4.5.1 in this paper and Section 2 in [5]). First, the verifier
decides t by measuring in the computational basis on G0 and v by the coin-flipping protocol with prover
1 (i.e., the honest prover 1 commits to random s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}, the honest verifier selects s′1, s′2 ∈ {0, 1} at
random, the prover reveals s1, s2, and the two participants agree that the random bits are vi = si ⊕ s′i for
i = 1, 2). The verifier measures the encoded witness transversally by the projection H ′t,v. Measuring G0 in the
computational basis decides t and coin-flipping decides v. Here, the measurement by H ′t,v means applying the
corresponding Clifford gate Ct,v to (Y
i1
1 ,...,Y
i1
2N ), (Y
i2
1 , ...,Y
i2
2N ),..., (Y
ik
1 , ...,Y
ik
2N ) and applying the projection
onto computational basis. Here, i1, . . . ik is the indices of qubits on which H
′
t,v non-trivially acts. The output
is a string in {0, 1}2kN . Denote the output u = ui1 · · ·uik , where ui1 , ..., uik ∈ {0, 1}2N .
4.4.4 Provers’ Check and Response
The verifier sends k strings in {0, 1}2N to prover 1. There uniquely exist strings yi, zi ∈ {0, 1}N such that
pi(yizi) = ui for each ui ∈ {0, 1}N . Prover 1 continues if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. For all i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, yi ∈ DN , and at least one i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, yi ∈ D1N , where DN is a subset of
{0, 1}N representing classical codewords of the concatenated Steane code and D1N is a subset of DN
corresponding to logical bit 1.
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Preparation
Provers 0, 1, ..., p select and share a tuple (r, pi, a, b) uniformly at random, where r = r1 · · · ri0+p for
r1, ..., ri0+p ∈ {0,+,}N , pi ∈ S2N , and a = a1 · · · ai0+p, b = b1 · · · bi0+p for a1, ..., ai0+p, b1, ..., bi0+p ∈
{0, 1}2N . The provers will use this random string to encode their qubits which correspond to the qubits that
the provers in the LHI+ protocol would send. The encoding process is described in Section 4.4.2.
Protocol
Select b = 0, 1 uniformly at random. Send b to prover 1, ..., p, and nothing to prover 0.
Do the following test depending on b = 0, 1:
1. (b = 0: GHZ test)
(1.1) Prover i (i = 1, ..., p) sends Gi. Prover 0 encodes (X0, ...,Xi0) (= (V,M1, ...,Mp,C1, ...,CT )) as
described in Section 4.4.2 and sends these qubits and G0.
(1.2) Measure G0,G1, ...,Gp by the projection onto
1√
2
(|0p+1〉 + |1p+1〉)⊗u. If 1√
2
(|0p+1〉 + |1p+1〉)⊗u is
measured, then accept. Otherwise reject.
2. (b = 1: History test)
(2.1) Prover i (i = 1, ..., p) encodes Xi0+i(= Mei) described in Section 4.4.2 and sends these qubits
and Gi. Prover 1 additionally sends z = commit(pi, a, b, s). Prover 0 encodes X0, ...,Xi0(=
(V,M1, ...,Mp,C1, ...,CT )) as described in Section 4.4.2 and sends these qubits and G0.
(2.2.1) The verifier measures G0 in the computational basis. Let t be the outcome.
(2.2.2) Prover 1 and the verifier engage in a coin-flipping protocol, choosing a two bit string v uniformly
at random. Here, v specifies one of the Clifford gates of Ht =
∑
vH
′
t,v. H
′
t,v is described in Section
4.4.3.
(2.2.3) The verifier applies the Clifford operation Ct,v transversally to the qubits (Y
i1
1 ,...,Y
i1
2N ),
(Yi21 , ...,Y
i2
2N ),..., (Y
ik
1 , ...,Y
ik
2N ) as described in Section 4.4.3 and measures all of these qubits in the
computational basis, for (i1, ..., ik) being the indices of the qubits upon which the Hamiltonian
term Ht,v acts non-trivially. The verifier sends the output to prover 1.
(2.2.4) Prover 1 checks whether the output sent from the verifier is consistent with the trap qubits
and Steane code (described in Section 4.4.4). If they are inconsistent, then abort. If they are
consistent, prover 1 proves that the output corresponds to a yes output of the LHI+ protocol by
a zero-knowledge protocol of NP.
Figure 7: Summary of Zero-Knowledge Protocol for QMIP∗
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2. 〈zi1 · · · zik |C⊗Nt,v |ri1 · · · rik〉 6= 0.
We define the predicate Rt,v(r, u, pi) which takes the value 1 iff the above two conditions hold. Assume that
Rt,v(r, u, pi) = 1 and prover 1 continues the protocol. For any a = a1 · · · ai0+p, b = b1 · · · bi0+p, there uniquely
exist α ∈ {±i,±1} and c1, ..., ci0+p, d1, ..., di0+p ∈ {0, 1}2N such that the next equation holds and can be
computed in polynomial time in N .
C⊗2Nt (X
a1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xai0+pZbi0+p) = α(Xc1Zd1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xci0+pZdi0+p)C⊗2Nt (26)
That is, the following statement is a NP statement: there are a string s and a tuple (pi, a, b, r) such that
commit(pi, a, b, s) = z and Rt,v(r, u ⊕ c1, ..., ci0+p, pi) = 1, where c is defined by Eq.(26). Prover 1 convinces
the verifier of this statement by a zero-knowledge protocol of NP.
4.5 Analysis
As we mentioned before, the analysis is almost the same as [5]. Hence we explain only the main difference.
4.5.1 Clifford gates and Clifford Hamiltonians
The zero-knowledge protocol by Broadbent et al. [5] critically uses the condition that all Hamiltonians consist
of Clifford gates and projections onto computational basis. Here we prove that the following Hamiltonians
are the sums of Clifford Hamiltonian for Ut = SWAP,CNOT . SWAP and CNOT can be easily constructed
by the product of unitary operators of {H ⊗H,Λ(P )}. Hence this step is not essentially necessary, but we
prove this to simplify the LHI+ protocol. Now Ht is defined as follows;
Ht = |10〉Ct−1,Ct+1〈10|Ct−1,Ct+1 ⊗ (|0〉〈0|Ct ⊗ Id + |1〉〈1|Ct ⊗ Id− |1〉〈0|Ct ⊗ Ut − |0〉〈1|Ct ⊗ U†t )
Ht acts on |〉Ct−1,Ct+1 as a trivial projection onto computational basis, and hence we consider only other three
qubits. For Ut = SWAP , Ht is the sum of the projections onto the following vectors;
{|+〉(|01〉 − |10〉), |−〉|00〉, |−〉|11〉, |−〉(|01〉+ |10〉)}.
Here, |+〉(|01〉 − |10〉) = |+〉((Id ⊗ X)CNOT | − 0〉), and |−〉(|01〉 + |10〉) = |−〉((Id ⊗ X)CNOT | + 0〉)
and hence these projections are Clifford Hamiltonians. The control qubits of the CNOT in these operators
is the left qubit.
For Ut = CNOT , Ht is the sum of the projections onto the following vectors;
{|+ 1−〉, | − 1+〉, | − 0+〉, | − 0−〉}.
4.5.2 Soundness
In the analysis of Broadbent et al.’s protocol [5], the prover can prepare the state accepted by the original local
Hamiltonian test with high probability by decoding the encoded qubits which can pass their zero-knowledge
protocol with high probability. The decoding process is applied to each logical qubit isolatedly. Hence, if the
provers in Figure 7 pass with high probability, then the provers can also pass the LHI protocol with high
probability by decoding the qubits in Figure 7.
4.5.3 Zero-Knowledge
Finally, we discuss zero-knowledge. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4, we only have to consider the case
that the malicious verifier requires provers 1, ..., p to do the history test, and we can assume that prover i who
received b = 1 measures Gi in the computational basis. In the case of the history test, honest provers send
the state that depends on the uniform random variable t ∈ [2u]. The state may depend on t, but the analysis
of [5] showed that there is only negligible change of the outputs of the simulator if the honest measurement
on the state can pass the prover’s check with high probability.
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5 Conclusion
There are obvious open problems: whether there exist the statistical/perfect zero-knowledge systems of
QMIP∗. One possible method is the algebraic technique. In quantum complexity theory, the technique of
enforcing algebraic structures on the strategy of provers is recently applied to investigate the power of MIP∗
(to prove NEXP ⊆ MIP∗[14, 21, 26], to construct short proofs for QMA with large completeness-soundness
gap [22], and to prove NEXP ⊆ MIP∗ with zero-knowledge [8], for example). Extensions of such algebraic
methods to history states of QMIP∗ protocols may enable perfect zero-knowledge systems for QMIP∗.
The parameters will not be optimal. Though most improvements of parameters will directly follow from
improvements of QMIP∗ protocols without zero-knowledge condition, we note an important problem related to
zero-knowledge. Parallel repetition is a direct tool to improve completeness/soundness gap. Parallel repetition
of zero-knowledge protocols, however, may not preserve zero-knowledge even in single-prover classical zero-
knowledge systems ([13], Section 4.5.4). Hence it might be difficult to improve completeness/soundness gap
preserving the number of turns by parallel repetition.
Finally, we believe that LHI protocols of interactive proofs would be a powerful tool which makes much
previous research for Local Hamiltonian problems applicable to interactive proof systems.
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A Elimination of the honest condition without new provers
In this section, we eliminate the honest condition without adding extra provers. We use the technique
that Kobayashi [18] used to eliminate the honest condition of single-prover quantum zero-knowledge systems
depending on the rewinding by Watrous [30]. We give the protocol in Figure 9, which is transformed from
Figure 8 similarly to the transformation from Figure 1 to Figure 2, is zero-knowledge even to the malicious
verifier by a direct construction of a simulator. (The difference between Figure 8 and Figure 1 is the number
of turns and the number of provers.) The simulator is described in Figure 10.
Proof of Zero Knowledge (sketch). Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, we can assume that the verifier sends
the same b = 0 or 1 to all provers due to the GHZ test.
After that, the analysis is almost the same as the one by Kobayashi [18], who used the rewinding [30].
Denote the malicious verifier’s first circuit by V ′1 . We can denote the state in (V,M,C) by ΨV (x, 2) =
1
2 (|0〉〈0|C⊗σ0+|1〉〈1|C⊗σ1). Here, σ0, σ1 are density operators of V,M and |0〉〈0|C, |1〉〈1|C are one qubit of C.
(the amplitudes of |0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1| may not be exactly equal since we do not assume perfect zero-knowledge, but
the difference is negligible since we assume computational quantum zero-knowledge.) In addition, TrMσ0 =
TrMσ1 holds. If the output of the measurement of D is 0, then the state in (I,A,V,M) is indistinguishable from
the state of the malicious verifier after the third turn. The probability that the output of the measurement of
D = 0, 1 is almost equally 1/2 since C = 0, 1 is independent from C′. Hence the rewinding [18, 30] works.
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Let V1, V2 be the circuit that the verifier of a three-turn protocol for HVQMZK
∗(p, 3, 1− , 1− δ) applies after
receiving message registers (M1,M2, ...,Mp) from provers 1, ..., p, respectively, at the first turn and the third
turn. The public coin protocol is the following;
1. Receive V from prover 1.
2. Select b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b to all provers.
3. Do the following tests based on b = 0, 1;
(a) (b = 0: Forward test)
Receive Mi from prover i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ p. Apply V2 to (V,M1, ...,Mp). If the state in (V,M1, ...,Mk)
is accepted by the original protocol, then accept. Reject otherwise.
(b) (b = 1: Backward test)
Receive Mi from prover i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ p. Apply (V1)† to (V,M1, ...,Mp). If all qubits in (V) are
|0〉, then accept. Reject otherwise.
Figure 8: Public coin protocol for a three-turn quantum interactive proof.
V,Mi are the same as Figure 8. In addition, we use G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp, which are all 1 qubit register. At the
start, prover i has Gi.
1. Receive V from prover 1.
2. Select b′ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b′ to provers 1, ..., p.
3. Do the following steps depending on b′ = 0, 1;
(a) (b′ = 0: GHZ test)
Prover i sends Gi, for i = 1, ..., p. Measure (G0,G1,G2, ...,Gp) by the projection onto
1√
2
(|0p+1〉+
|1p+1〉). If 1√
2
(|0p+1〉+ |1p+1〉) is measured, then accept.
(b) (b′ = 1: History test)
Prover i sends Mi and Gi, for i = 1, ..., p. Measure G0 in the computational basis. Let b the
outcome. The verifier simulates step 3 of the protocol in Figure 8 depending on b.
Figure 9: General zero-knowledge protocol based on the public coin protocol in Figure 8.
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Registers used by the simulator.
I Input that the malicious verifier uses to get information.
A′ Ancillas of the malicious verifier.
C′ Coin qubit of the malicious verifier.
V Register that the (honest or malicious) verifier receives at the first turn.
M Register that the (honest or malicious) verifier receives at the third turn.
A Ancillas of the simulator.
C Coin qubit of the honest verifier.
D Register for checking whether C,C′ equals or not.
Construction of the simulator using the simulator for the honest verifier at the third turn SV .
0. Prepare the input ρ in I and |0〉 in other registers.
1. Apply SV to (V,M,C,A).
2. Apply V ′1 to (I,A
′,V,C′).
3. Copy the XOR of (C,C′) to D.
4. Measure D in the computational basis. If the measurement outputs 0, then output (I,A′,C′,V,M). If the
measurement outputs 1, then apply V ′1
†
and then apply SV
† to (V,M,C,A).
5. If (A′,C′,V,M,A,C,D) are all |0〉, then apply the phase flip. Apply SV and then apply V ′1 . Output
(I,A,′ C,′ V,M).
Figure 10: Simulator for the malicious verifier.
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